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CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Terrance Sandalow*
"[Wie must never forget," Chief Justice Marshall admonished us
in a statement pregnant with more than one meaning, "that it is a
constitution we are expounding."' Marshall meant that the Constitution should be read as a document "intended to endure for ages.to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs."' 2 But he meant also that the construction placed
upon the document must have regard for its "great outlines" and
"important objects."' 3 Limits are implied by the very nature of the
task. There is not the same freedom in construing the Constitution
as in constructing a moral code.
The conclusion that there are limits to the meaning that may be
given the Constitution is not likely to arouse controversy. Yet, that
conclusion masks an important ambiguity concerning the source and
permanence of those limits. The boundaries of permissible constitutional interpretation, it might be argued, are set by the intentions of
those who drafted and ratified the original document and the several
amendments to it. Accommodation to change through interpretation
is not wholly foreclosed on this view, for the Constitution often
speaks in generalities, but (proponents of this view maintain) present
judgment is securely bounded by the intentions of "the framers."
The opposing view is less easily stated. At the risk of initial oversimplification, the boundaries of permissible constitutional interpretation are, on that view, subject to continuous adjustment. The
meaning of the Constitution is never fixed; rather, it changes over
time to accommodate altered circumstances and evolving values.
Only the former view, it seems apparent, is compatible with the recurrent claim that the Constitution itself stipulates the values that
must be employed in making decisions. The latter view recognizes
limits to the interpretation that may properly be placed upon the
Constitution,4 but it does not treat those limits as embedded in the
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1954. J.D. 1957.
University of Chicago. - Ed.
I. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
4. See text at notes 79-83 infra.
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Constitution. It regards constitutional law not as an expression of
values written into the Constitution by the framers, but as the product of a continuing process of valuation carried on by those to whom
the task of constitutional interpretation has been entrusted.
I
The notion that constitutional interpretation consists of determining the intentions of the framers occupies an important place in
the history of thought about the Constitution. Many persons, including some of the most distinguished members of the Supreme Court,
have urged that precisely because it is a constitution we are expounding, there is a duty of fidelity to the intentions of those who
drafted and ratified the document. Thus, Chief Justice Taney, in deciding "whether a person of the African race can be a citizen of the
United States," wrote:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or
feeling ... should induce the Court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an
argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to
interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode
prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but
while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only the same in words, but
the same in meaning .... 5
A century later, Mr. Justice Black developed a similar theme and
purported to make it a cornerstone of his constitutional philosophy.
Rejecting a claim that the death penalty should be held to violate the
eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," he wrote:
In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment
because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here
and in the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the
Amendment was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that6 the framers
intended to end capital punishment by the Amendment.
Views such as those expressed by Taney and Black may at times
5. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 425, 426 (1857).
6. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (separate opinion of Black, J.). The
theme recurs in many of Justice Black's opinions. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-78 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
69-74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). His emphasis upon the intentions of the framers was, of
course, intimately bound up with his views on the appropriate role of a judiciary in a democracy, but in light of the central role he accorded the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution,
his admonitions must be understood as addressed not only to the judiciary, but as expressing
principles binding upon all who are engaged in constitutional interpretation.
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have influenced constitutional decision, 7 but it is beyond doubt that
they do not reflect the course of American constitutional development. Constitutional decision-making has not been confined to a
process of discovering the specific intentions of the framers. There
are various reasons why this is so,8 but the most pervasive is that the
questions for which subsequent generations have sought answers in
the Constitution have been the questions of those generations. Since
those questions were, most often, not the ones the framers had specifically addressed, it is not surprising that answers were not to be
found in the framers' specific intentions. Even the most prophetic of
the men who drafted and ratified the Constitution had no occasion
to speculate concerning the role of the federal government, vis-A-vis
the states, in the management of an integrated and industrialized national economy. Nor did the men of a later generation, who imposed
on each state the obligation to afford every person "the equal protection of the laws," have reason to consider whether those words
should be held to prohibit sex-based discrimination at a time when
the relations between the sexes would be far different from those
they had known or could have imagined. Although these and myriad other issues not anticipated by the framers have over the years
pressed for solution, the notion that the meaning assigned to the
Constitution ought to turn upon the intentions of the framers has
continued to exert a strong attraction. The effort to resolve that dilemma has led to an appreciation that the concept of "intention" is a
good deal more ambiguous than the statements of Chief Justice Taney and Justice Black suggest.
The intentions of the framers can, for example, be described on
different levels of generality. On one level, it is entirely accurate to
state that the framers intended to allow the death penalty and to
deny Congress the authority to regulate the quantity of wheat that a
farmer might grow for domestic consumption. And the men who
adopted the fourteenth amendment intended to permit legislation
that would bar women from certain occupations or in a yariety of
other ways distinguish between men and women. At the same time,
it seems entirely plausible to understand the framers as having intended to prohibit all "cruel and unusual punishments," not merely
specific practices with which they were familiar and to which they
objected. Similarly, in authorizing Congress to "regulate commerce
7. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898).
8. See Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses ofHistory in ConstitutionalInterpretation,31
U. CHi. L. REv. 502 (1964).
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. . .among the several states," the framers can appropriately be un-

derstood as intending to invest it with power to regulate not only
specific activities that they knew affected that commerce but any activity that might do so. So also, the guarantee of "equal protection
of the laws" can be understood as proscribing not only certain practices directed against blacks, with which the draftsmen were immediately concerned, but also all other practices that arbitrarily
distinguish among classes of individuals. To ask, in each instance,
whether the framers "intended" the specific or the general is to pose
a question that almost invariably is unanswerable. The question assumes that they intended one or the other, but not both. But the
issues did not arise for the framers in a way that forced such a
choice: they could have intended both simultaneously because,
viewing them as compatible, they had no reason to choose between
them.9
The insight that intentions can be understood in general terms
has played an important role in the development of constitutional
law, for it has provided a means by which to mediate between the
belief that the meaning of the Constitution ought to be found in the
intentions of the framers and the need to accommodate the Constitution to changing circumstances and values. Armed with the awareness that the "intentions of the framers" need not be understood to
denote only their most particular intentions, and that the "important
objects" of the Constitution could not be achieved if its meaning
were held to be confined to such intentions, courts have generally
looked to those "important objects" in interpreting the Constitution,
secure in the belief that in doing so they were still construing the
9. The point is well illustrated by an exchange between Thaddeus Stevens and Robert
Hale during debate over an early version of what was to become the "equal protection" clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Hale objected to the proposal on the ground that it would
authorize Congress to override "all state legislation . . .affecting the individual citizen."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1866). For example, said Hale, all states distinguished between the property rights of married women, on the one hand, and of unmarried
women and men on the other. Such distinctions might be outlawed by Congress were the
proposal to be adopted. Stevens responded that "[w]hen a distinction is made between two
married people or two femmes sole, then it is unequal legislation; but where all of the same
class are dealt with in the same way then there is no pretense of inequality." Id at 1064.
Although inelegantly, Stevens was, as Professor Bickel once observed, "propounding a theory
of reasonable classification." Bickel, The Original Understandingandthe SegregationDecision,

69 HARV. L. REv. 1,36 (1955). The significance of Stevens's response, for present purposes, is
that his ground for denying that the proposal would have the reach suggested by Hale was not
that the distinction between married and unmarried women would survive adoption of the
proposal even though it were arbitrary. It would survive, in his view, because it was not arbitrary. He thus had no occasion to choose between an intent to eliminate arbitrary distinctions
in state law and an intent to leave undisturbed state power to treat married and unmarried
women differently. The necessity for such a choice would arise only if that distinction came to
be perceived as arbitrary. See text at notes 69-78 infra.
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Constitution, not creating it. 10 Congressional regulation of agriculture, the virtual abolition of capital punishment, and significant restriction of governmental power to discriminate on the basis of sex
may not have been specifically intended by the framers, but each
might be thought to have roots in their larger purposes.
The belief that those larger purposes could serve as a touchstone
for constitutional interpretation has, of course, been especially important because constitutional development has occurred so largely
through the institution of judicial review. The conventional understanding of the courts' warrant for the power they exercise is not that
the values of judges are preferable to those of legislators, or that
judges are a better barometer of contemporary societal values than
legislators, but that the values embodied in the Constitution - the
"important objects" of those who framed the document - are best
entrusted to their care. It has long been accepted, of course, that the
performance of this function requires the appraisal of new circumstances and, hence, additional value choices. But these additional
value choices have been viewed as subsidiary to those written into
the Constitution by the framers and, therefore, as susceptible to evaluation on the basis of their tendency to serve the larger purposes to
which the framers committed the nation. Constitutional theory and
the institution of judicial review have thus been seen as mutually
supportive: judicial review is necessary to assure fidelity to the intentions of the framers, and it is justifiable, notwithstanding its unrepresentative character, because the values to which courts give
expression are those to which the nation is bound by the Constitution.
A representative statement of this view of the Constitution and of
the judicial role is contained in a much-noted article by Judge J.
Skelly Wright arguing that courts should play an active role in en10. The argument has at times been made that different provisions of the Constitution are
to be construed differently, some by determining the specific intentions of the framers and
others by looking to their larger purposes. Justice Frankfurter, for example, found a distinction between "[g]reat concepts like 'Commerce. . . among the several States,' 'due process of
law,' 'liberty,' 'property' [which] were purposely left to gather meaning from experience," National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and "very specific provisions of the Constitution" whose "meaning was so settled by
history that definition was superfluous." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Professor Willard Hurst has taken a somewhat similar position,

emphasizing a distinction between provisions concerning "particular legal agencies or particular legal procedures," where the constitution employs terms that have a "precise, history-filled

content," and provisions that "outline substantive power and... announce standards for the
use of power." Hurst, TheRole ofHistory, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 55, 57 (E.
Calm ed. 1954). For a useful critique of these distinctions, see Wofford, supra note 8, at 515-

20.

HeinOnline -- 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1037 1980-1981

1038

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 79:1033

forcing the Constitution against the other agencies of government.
In developing that thesis, Judge Wright rejects the "axiom. . . that a
constitutional value choice is the functional equivalent of an ordinary policy decision." "Constitutional choices," he asserts, "are in
fact different from ordinary decisions. The reason is simple: the
most important value choices have already been made by the framers of the Constitution."' 2 Judge Wright is not Justice Roberts, however. He recognizes that the answers to constitutional questions
cannot be determined simply by laying "the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged,"' 13 and
that value choices remain to be made in determining the application
of the Constitution to contemporary problems. Still, Judge Wright
argues, the "broad, majestic language" of the Constitution was intended "to guarantee a general sort of relation between the government and its citizens."
[T]hose outlines provide significant and sufficient guidance; the [additional] value choices [now required] are to be made only within the
parameters of the most important value choices embedded in the constitutional language. No matter how imprecise in application to specific modern fact situations, the constitutional guarantees do provide a
They rule
direction, a goal, an ideal citizen-government relationship.
14
out many alternative directions, goals, and ideals.
The view that constitutional interpretation involves primarily an
elucidation of the general intentions of the framers is understandably attractive, perhaps not only because it seems to support the institutional arrangements we have established for giving contemporary meaning to the Constitution, but also because it is so
comforting. The uneasiness, often the agony, and always the responsibility that accompany a difficult choice are softened by the belief
that real choice does not exist. In law, the search for repose leads us
to attribute responsibility for decisions to those who have gone
before and, in constitutional law, to wise men we call "the framers."
They may not have foreseen the world in which we live nor the
problems we now face, but the words they wrote nonetheless provide
"sufficient guidance" if only we have the wisdom to understand them
properly. And so the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer and the
libertarianism of John Stuart Mill, though not in the minds of those
who wrote the Constitution, have at different times each been found
11. See Wright, ProfessorBickel, the Scholarly Tradition,and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 769 (1971).
12. Id at 784.
13. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
14. Wright, supra note 11, at 784-85.
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there by men who, no doubt sincerely, believed that the "broad, majestic language" of the Constitution was intended to guarantee that
"general sort of relationship between the government and its citizens." Nor does it pass belief that one day soon (perhaps its dawn
has already broken) the egalitarianism of John Rawls will also be
5
found there.1
The "ideal citizen-government relationship" that Judge Wright
finds "embedded in the constitutional language" is not, of course, the
relationship that Justices Field and Brewer found in the identical
language three quarters of a century earlier, but rather the relationship defined in the decisions of the Warren Court, "the one institution. . . that seemed to be speaking most consistently the language
of idealism that we all recited in grade school."' 16 It would be nearer
the truth to say that the work of the Warren Court, as that of the
Court in the days of Field and Brewer, demonstrates that the substance of constitutional law, as of common law, "at any given time
pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient."' 17 In some measure, no doubt, what is "understood to be convenient" depends upon the past. Constitutional
values are not born of the moment; they have a history that must be
understood if they are to be realized. Our circumstances are perceived in part through the lens of earlier valuations and our aspirations are in part shaped by them.' 8 Ultimately, nevertheless, the
values to which constitutional law gives expression are more nearly
those of the present than those of the past.
To see that that is so, one need only imagine a stranger to the
United States who procures a copy of the Constitution in order to
gain an understanding of the relationship it establishes between individuals and government. His first discovery is that government in
the United States is not unitary; there are both state governments
and a national government. Careful examination of the document
reveals, moreover, that there are substantially different restrictions
upon the exercise of state and national power over individuals.
Neither government, to be sure, may pass a bill of attainder or ex
postfacto law; 19 deprive any person of life, liberty or property with15. See generally, Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional We/fare Rights: One View of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973);'Michelman, Foreword-On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
16. Wright, supra note 11, at 804.
17. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
18. See Holmes, Learningand Science, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 84, 85 (M. Howe ed. 1962).

19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
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out due process of law;20 or deny citizens the right to vote on grounds
23
of race, 21 sex,22 or age (if they are eighteen years of age or older).
These are the only similarities, however, and there are many differences. The states, but not the national government, are prohibited
from impairing the obligation of contracts 24 and denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.25 On the other hand, the fed26
eral government, but not the states, is subject to a Bill of Rights,
the many provisions of which are too familiar to require specification. In addition, neither the federal government nor the states may
deny citizens the right to vote in federal elections because of a failure
to pay any tax, but there is no similar restriction concerning state
elections.27
The stranger, were he unfamiliar with our history, might well
puzzle over the reason for such different limitations on national and
state power, but he could hardly doubt that in the United States the
relationship between government and individuals, so far as it is embodied in fundamental law, largely depends upon whether the government involved is that of the nation or of a state. He would, of
course, be quite wrong. With at most a few exceptions, the constitutional rights of individuals against state and national governments
are now the same. The few restrictions that the contracts clause imposes upon state power appear to be equally applicable to the national government through the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 28 Restrictions on state power under the equal protection clause also apply equally to the national government, again
through the due process clause.29 Nearly all of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights have been extended to the states, once more through
the ubiquitous "due process" clause (though now of the fourteenth
20. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
26. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. Inspection of the Constitution alone will not, of course,
reveal the inapplicability of all of the Bill of Rights to the states. Only the first and tenth
amendments are in terms limited to the national government, but it is beyond doubt that the
entire Bill of Rights was intended to be applicable only to the national government and the
Supreme Court so held at an early date. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32

U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV.
28. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 n.25 (1977); Hale, The
Supreme Court andthe Contract Clause (pts. 1-3), 57 HARV. L. REv. 512, 621, 852, 890 (1944).

29. See Karst, The Ffth Amendment's Guaranteeof EqualProtection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541
(1977).
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amendment), and have been held to impose identical restrictions on
state and national power.30 And, finally, citizens may not, in state
elections any more than in federal elections, be denied the right to
vote because of a failure to pay a tax. To deprive them of the vote
for that reason would deny them "the equal protection of the
3
laws., '

How are we to account for these differences between the histori-

cal document and contemporary constitutional law? To suggest that
the latter is merely the application to modem life of an "ideal citi-

zen-government relationship" contemplated by the framers is to ignore the evidence of the very document that supposedly expresses
that ideal. Whatever ideals were in the minds of those who drafted

and ratified the original Constitution and its several amendments
(and it is a rather heroic assumption that those ideals were constant
over time or even that the same ideals actuated all those who at any

one time combined in support of a constitutional proposal32 ), it
seems plain enough that the ideals did not embrace the need for

nearly identical restrictions upon state and national power over individuals. The imposition of a unitary set of restrictions on state and

national power was the work of a later day. It is not merely coincidence that this development has occurred almost entirely over the

last fifty years, a period during which federalist values have been
30. In 1969, the Court wrote that the due process clause "now protects the [fifth amendment] right to compensation for property taken by the State; the rights of free speech, press,
and religion covered by the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence
illegally seized; the right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to be free of compelled selfincrimination; and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to
confrontation of opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1969) (footnotes omitted). In Duncan, the Court
added to that list the sixth amendment right to jury trial in criminal cases and since that time it
has added the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, see Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969), the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,
see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and (at least in dictum) the bail guarantee of the
eighth amendment. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971). Remarkably, the Court
has even found the ninth amendment relevant to a determination of the limits of state power.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
In extending provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states, the Court has insisted that "the
same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal governments." Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969). But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
31. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
The imposition of a set of unitary limitations on state and national power was, of course,
not entirely the work of the Warren Court. In some instances, as in the assimilation of the
"impairment of contract" and fifth amendment "due process" clauses, the task was completed
at an earlier time. See note 28 supra. In others, for example the extension of a number of
provisions to the Bill of Rights to the states, the process was under way prior to the Warren
Court. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
32. See, e.g., M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-31 (1965).
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subject to increasing pressure from the centralizing tendencies of
modem life. Both the reality of American government and the way
it is perceived have changed during these years. Increased mobility
and the growth of mass communication have more and more led us
to see ourselves as one nation and, together with a rising egalitarianism, have led to a reduced willingness to treat each state as a separate political community. The "layer cake" model of federal-state
relations - by which government is divided into separate levels,
each operating within a separate sphere - has been replaced by that
of the "marble cake" - which emphasizes federal-state cooperation
and shared responsibility over nearly the entire range of governmental programs. Although perhaps not inevitable, it is at least not surprising that in these circumstances constitutional law should come to
reflect the idea that in their relations with government, at any level,
all Americans, wherever located, are entitled to those protections
that we as a people hold to be fundamental. That idea may or may
not be a desirable one for our times - I do not want to argue the
point here - but it does describe contemporary constitutional law
and it was not bequeathed to us by "the framers," except as they set
us on the path by which we might find our way to it and to other
principles that seem appropriate in the light of our current circumstances and aspirations.
The establishment of nearly identical constitutional limitations
on state and national power marks a significant departure from the
historical document, but it represents only a fraction of the distance
we have traveled in shaping constitutional law to our present values.
The meaning of the various limitations on governmental power has
changed no less dramatically than their applicability. The members
of the First Congress, together with the state legislatures, wrote that
in "all criminal prosecutions the accused shall.

. .

have the Assist-

ance of Counsel for his defense," intending to assure that a defendant's right to retain counsel would be inviolate. 33 A century and a
half later the Supreme Court held that this language in the sixth
amendment also conferred a right to the appointment of counsel if
the accused was indigent. 34 In the wake of the Civil War, the victors
sought to guarantee blacks the rights of citizenship - and perhaps
more broadly to create a basis for federal citizenship clearly independent of state citizenship - by including in the Constitution the
33. See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 109-10 (1951).

IN AMERICAN COURTS

27-30 (1955); F.

34. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.

335 (1963).
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provision that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." There is no evidence
that this language was thought to limit whatever power Congress
might have to provide for expatriation. 35 Yet, in 1967, after a decade
of struggle to find a plausible basis for limiting congressional power,
the Court held that the quoted language denied Congress all power
to deprive a person of citizenship unless it was voluntarily relin36
quished.
A comprehensive study of the origins of the first amendment provision that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press" - language which to contemporary ears
sounds clear and all-embracing - concludes that those who drafted
and ratified the amendment had a far more restrictive understanding
of its meaning. 37 Undoubtedly, it meant (to them) that Congress
could impose no prior restraints, no system of licensing such as
Milton had inveighed against inAreopagitica. Perhaps they also understood that it would establish truth as an absolute defense in prosecutions for seditious libel and that it would confer a right to have a
jury determine both law and fact in such cases. Conceivably, though
the scholar who has most closely examined the question concludes
otherwise, they thought it would ban all federal prosecutions for seditious libel. 38 However broadly one views the meaning they attributed to that language, it seems plain enough that they did not
anticipate the breadth of the protection that contemporary constitutional law affords freedom of expression - protection so extensive as
to defy brief description. 39 It is scarcely to be imagined, for example,
that the framers of the first amendment contemplated the constitutionalization of the law of libel that has occurred during the past two
decades 40 or the broad protection now enjoyed by sexually explicit
41
material.
35. See Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man, With Soul so Dead
1963 Sup. CT. REv. 325.
36. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
37. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
38. See id at 1-17.
39. For a comprehensive survey, see W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 649-1162 (5th ed. 1980).
40. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. See, e.g., cases collected in W. LOCKHART, Y KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 39, at
869-927.
The premises of the framers' thought were so different from ours that almost inevitably
there is some distortion in stating their understanding so summarily. Thus, it seems likely that
the framers did not believe that the first amendment extended to civil libel actions or to sexu. .?",
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The departures from the historical document in shaping constitu-

tional law to current perceptions of need are not restricted to instances in which constitutional provisions have been broadened
beyond the understanding of the framers. At times the Court has

narrowed the original meaning to accommodate the Constitution to
those perceptions. Thus, among the sources of the discontent that
led to the convention of 1787, few were more important than the
"ignoble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors and
the invasion of contractual obligations" 42 adopted during the 1780s.
The importance of that experience in shaping the Constitution can
hardly be overstated, for it called into question, as Madison wrote in
1787, "the fundamental principle of republican Government, that
the majority who rule in such governments are the safest Guardians
both of public Good and private rights. ' 43 When the members of
the convention prohibited the states from "impairing the obligation

of contracts," therefore, it seems clear that they did so, as Mr. Justice
Sutherland wrote a century and a half later in Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell," "with the specific and studied purpose of
preventing legislation designed to relieve debtors especially in time
of financial distress. '4 5 Justice Sutherland, however, wrote in dis-

sent. A majority of the Court sustained Minnesota's Mortgage Moratorium Law notwithstanding the clarity of the framers' intentions

because "full recognition of the occasion and general purpose of the
clause does not suffice to fix its precise scope." The "scope of the

constitutional prohibition" is to be determined, rather, by examining
"the course of judicial decisions in its application," 46 decisions dem-

onstrating "that there has been a growing appreciation of public
needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational comproally explicit material at least in part because it did not occur to them that federal power
reached these subjects. Many believed that the first amendment - indeed, the entire Bill of
Rights - was unnecessary because they thought that Congress had not been given power to
legislate concerning speech and the press - or the other subjects that eventually were covered
by the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 555, 559 (E. Earle ed. 1941); G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-87, at 536-43 (1969). Even those
who perceived the need for a Bill of Rights, however, must surely have supposed - to the
extent that the issue can be thought to have entered their minds - that control over libel and
obscenity was firmly in the hands of the states. In these circumstances, it can hardly be
imagined that they paused to consider whether the first amendment had any relevance to libel
and obscenity.
42. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934).
43. Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in II WRITINGS OF
MADISON 361, 366 (G. Hunt ed. 1901), quotedin G. WOOD, supra note 41, at 410. See generally G. WOOD, supra note 41, at 396-413.
44. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
45. 290 U.S. at 453 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
46. 290 U.S. at 428.
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mise between individual rights and public welfare." 47
Now it is true that all the decisions shaping constitutional law to
contemporary values can also be understood as coming within the
general intentions of the framers. All that is necessary is to state
those intentions at a sufficiently high level of abstraction. The framers may not specifically have intended that the first amendment
would restrict private actions for libel, but they believed "that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government. . . . Believing in the power
of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed si48
lence coerced by law - the argument of force in its worst form."
An unrestricted right of action for libel would trench upon that purpose; hence, the Constitution must - in furtherance of the framers'
intent - be read as restricting the permissible scope of libel actions.
"Bill of attainder" may have carried a precise meaning for the framers, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter once argued; 4 9 yet, the Supreme
Court has said, "the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a
narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition,
but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or
more simply - trial by legislature. '50 Implementation of that purpose, the Supreme Court held, required invalidation of legislation
prohibiting members of the Communist Party from serving as officers or employees of labor unions - legislation which, whatever its
unwisdom, no member of the Philadelphia convention or of the state
ratifying conventions would have recognized as a bill of attainder.
Even a decision sustaining Minnesota's Mortgage Moratorium Law
might find support in the framers' larger purposes, for as Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court: "The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government
by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while - a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good
order of society." 5' There is, accordingly, "no warrant for the conclusion. . . that the founders of our Government would have interpreted the clause differently" 52 than the Court has over the years.
47. 290 U.S. at 442.
48. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting Brandeis, J., concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)).
49. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320-24 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).

51. 290 U.S. at 435.
52. 290 U.S. at 443.
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"The vast body of law which has been developed [over the years]
was unknown to the fathers, but it is believed to have preserved the
essential content and the spirit of the Constitution."53
Reference to the "important objects" of the framers rather than
their specific intentions is, no doubt, a necessity if the evolving needs
of the nation are to be served. The amendment process established
by article V simply will not sustain the entire burden of adaptation
that must be borne if the Constitution is to remain a vital instrument
of government. Yet, it must be recognized that the more general the
statement of the framers' intentions, the weaker is the claim that
those intentions circumscribe present judgment. To begin with, our
understanding of the framers' intentions is necessarily distorted if we
focus solely upon their larger purposes, ignoring the particular judgments they made in expressing those purposes. Intentions do not exist in the abstract; they are forged in response to particular
circumstances and in the collision of multiple purposes which impose bounds upon one another. "[T]o make a general principle
worth anything," as Holmes wrote,
you must give it a body; you must show in what way and how far it
would be applied actually in an actual system; you must show how it
has gradually emerged as the felt reconciliation of concrete instances
..

.

. Finally, you must show its historic relations to other principles,

often of very different date and origin, and thus set it in the54perspective
without which its proportions will never truly be judged.
So, too, in understanding the intentions of the framers. By wrenching the framers' "larger purposes" from the particular judgments
that revealed them, we incur a loss of perspective, a perspective that
might better enable us to see that the particular judgments they
made were not imperfect expressions of a larger purpose but a particular accommodation of competing purposes. In freeing ourselves
from those judgments we are not serving larger ends determined by
the framers but making room for the introduction of contemporary
values.
The "assistance of counsel" was indeed viewed by the framers as
an important constituent of fair trial, one of "the essential barriers
against arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights." 55 But their
intention to safeguard the right to such assistance in all federal criminal trials was shaped in part by a conception of the relationship
between government and its citizens, a conception that did not em53. 290 U.S. at 443.
54. Holmes, The Use ofLaw Schools, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHS OF JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 34, 41 (M. Howe ed. 1962).
55. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
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phasize - that barely recognized - an affirmative responsibility on
the part of government to its citizens. Absent a sense of such responsibility, it is not surprising that a trial might be deemed fair so long
as the defendant was not prohibited from retaining counsel to assist
him. Decisions during the past several decades establishing the right
of indigents accused of crime to appointed counsel do not merely
promote the framers' purpose to achieve fair trials. They also express a fundamentally altered conception of governmental responsibility and, accordingly, of what constitutes a fair trial. Virtually all
Americans accept the balance thus struck between the interests of
government and of indigent defendants as both wise and humane,
but it is a balance that reflects the values of contemporary America,
56
not those of the framers.
Contemporary constitutional law defining freedom of speech and
of the press, similarly, is not simply a more adequate expression of
the purpose of the framers than they themselves achieved - purposes somehow disembodied from the specific protections they understood to be within the compass of the first amendment - but a
fundamentally different accommodation of the interests affected by
principles governing the exercise of governmental power. Public discussion was, to be sure, greatly prized during the constitutional period both as a "natural right" of free men and as essential to
democratic government. The literature of the period is filled with
statements of its importance.5 7 So great is the allure of these expressions that we are apt to forget how different those times were from
our own. The framers, we need to remember, had not read John
Stuart Mill. They had not experienced, and thus had no reason to
address, the needs of a nation as pluralistic as the United States was
later to become. The political order, both of their own time and of
the earlier years in which the ideal of freedom of expression first
emerged, was far more fragile than that which has existed in the
United States at any time during the twentieth century. To reason
solely from their statements concerning the importance of public discussion is to ignore the fact that because of their circumstances and
their history they held competing values - stability of government,
security of private reputations, a conception of sexual morality, etc.
- that also played a role in shaping their understanding of freedom
of speech and of the press. We ought not to suppose that because
these competing values were less frequently given eloquent expres56. See note 33 supra.
57. See, e.g., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (L. Levy ed. 1966).

HeinOnline -- 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1047 1980-1981

1048

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 79:1033

sion they were entirely subordinated to public discussion. The competing values were already deeply imbedded in the law. The
struggle was to gain recognition of the importance of public discussion. The best evidence of the balance that was struck is not the
rhetoric that was employed, but the specific principles by which freedom of speech and the press were understood. When we ignore
those principles, stressing instead the importance that the framers attached to public discussion and deemphasizing competing values
that carried more weight for them than for us, the purposes we serve
are not those of the framers, but our own.
The growth of federal power under the commerce clause may
serve as a final illustration of the way in which reliance upon the
general intentions of the framers permits the values of the present to
dominate those of the past. It is customary to attribute to the framers the purpose of authorizing Congress to regulate "that commerce
which concerns more states than one." 58 In the decentralized, rural
economy of the late eighteenth century, that was a relatively limited
grant of authority. A considerable volume of economic activity was
not within the market economy; much, very likely most, activity that
was part of the market economy occurred within the boundaries of a
single state and had no discernible consequences outside that state.
In these circumstances, the power conferred upon Congress afforded
relatively limited opportunity to regulate private activity, and it offered little threat to the retention of very considerable autonomy in
the states. Congressional power to regulate "that commerce which
concerns more states than one," in the setting of an integrated, industrialized, modern economy strikes a very different balance between that power and the autonomy of states and individuals. Since
all commercial activity may have consequences outside the state in
which it occurs, the Congress has complete power to displace state
government as a source of economic policy. The expansion of the
market sector of the economy further extends federal power to displace state authority. Both changes in the economic structure, moreover, subject an ever-increasing proportion of life to federal
regulatory authority. Lifting the framers' "intentions" out of the
context in which they were formed, and employing them to deal with
current issues, thus yields consequences very different from those the
framers conceivably could have anticipated, and involves an accommodation of competing values that cannot reasonably be attributed
to them. The framers did intend to authorize Congress to regulate
58. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22*U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,85 (1824).
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"that commerce which concerns more states than one," but to separate that intention from their understanding that states and individuals retained substantial autonomy from federal control in the realm
of economic activity is to lose "the perspective without which its proportions will never truly be judged. ' 59 When the framers' intentions
are placed in perspective, it is apparent that attribution of the contemporary law of the commerce clause to them is chimerical.
The correspondence between those intentions and contemporary
law would not be increased, of course, if the latter were rewritten to
reduce federal power substantially, for that would merely frustrate
the framers' intention that Congress have authority to regulate "that
commerce which concerns more states than one."' 60 The difficulty,
obviously, is that in a modern economy we cannot confer that authority upon Congress and simultaneously allow a large measure of
individual and state autonomy. Objectives that were compatible in
the latter years of the eighteenth century have ceased to be so during
the twentieth. Contemporary constitutional law, in establishing a
new order among these objectives, does not reflect the intentions of
the framers but a contemporary choice as to how those objectives
ought to be ordered.
The law we ascribe to the Constitution is not, in brief, a legacy
from the "founding fathers" and the Reconstruction Congress. The
"goals" and "ideals" that Judge Wright sees "embedded in the constitutional language" are those that subsequent generations have
found there, which is not quite the same as saying that they were put
there by the framers. Contemporary constitutional law does, to be
sure, rest upon a conceptual framework and employ a vocabulary
that is in large measure derived from the framers. The question
whether legislation is within the authority of the federal government
must, even now, be decided within a framework which recognizes
that that government was constituted as one of enumerated powers.
We do not consider ourselves at liberty to ignore the question or to
answer it merely by demonstrating that the power can best be exercised by the federal government. Decisions continue to be justified
by an analysis which begins with the proposition that the exercise of
59. Holmes, supra note 54, at 41.
60. Herein lies the error of the decisions invalidating early New Deal legislation on the
ground that the commerce clause was not intended to authorize Congress to exercise plenary
power over the national economy. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 546-50 (1935). But it needs to be recognized that these decisions were no less true to
the framers' intentions than are more recent decisions regarding the scope of congressional
power. The two lines of authority merely emphasize (and ignore) different elements of the

framers' intentions.
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power must be referable to the "commerce" clause or one of the
other heads of federal power. Similarly, legislation is not beyond the
power of government simply because it is unwise or unjust. A decision limiting governmental power must be grounded in a limitation
of governmental power contained in the Constitution.
In making these decisions, however, the past to which we turn is
the sum of our history, not merely the choices made by those who
drafted and ratified the Constitution. The entirety of that history,
together with current aspirations that are both shaped by it and
shape the meaning derived from it, far more than the intentions of
the framers, determine what each generation finds in the Constitution. As Holmes put it in Missouri v. Holland:
when we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called
into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for
them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has
taken a century and cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said a hundred years ago. . . . We must consider what this
61
country has become in deciding what the Amendment has reserved.
Federal statutes may still require justification by an analysis that
begins with one of the enumerated powers, but the expansive reading
of those powers by subsequent generations has all but swallowed up
the space that the framers thought they had left between them. The
limiting concepts of the Constitution, similarly, have been read some broadly, some narrowly - to bring them into harmony with
contemporary views concerning the appropriate domain for the exercise of governmental power. Neither the text of the Constitution nor
the intentions of its draftsmen will explain why in the latter half of
the twentieth century the "contracts clause" is read grudgingly while
so generous an interpretation is given to "the freedom of speech"
and the right of criminal defendants to the "assistance of counsel."
An understanding of the current meaning of those provisions, and of
other clauses limiting governmental power, depends far more on familiarity with the history of the twentieth century than of the latter
years of the eighteenth.
No matter how capacious an interpretation they are given, of
course, the relatively specific limitations of governmental authority
in the Constitution - e.g, freedom of speech, cruel and unusual
61. 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920).
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punishment, and assistance of counsel - do not each have an unlimited capacity for growth. Were we dependent solely upon a few such
provisions to restrain governmental power, governments might do
much that we should prefer to put beyond their authority. To remedy that potential deficiency in the document as written, other
clauses have been read as (in effect) a continuing delegation to each
generation to find in the Constitution those limitations on governmental power that it believes appropriate. The Constitution has, in
other words, not only been read in light of contemporary circumstances and values; it has been read so that the circumstances and
values of the present generation might be given expression in constitutional law.
Thus, the fifth and fourteenth amendment provisions that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, and property, without due process of law" - provisions that historically and linguistically might
have been read as no more than a guarantee of procedural regularity
or perhaps procedural fairness - have been treated instead as "a
'62
compendious affirmation of the basic values of a free society."
What values are basic to a free society, as our history demonstrates,
is a question that different generations are likely to answer differently. In the age of enterprise, "liberty of contract" was thought to
be fundamental and, the framers having neglected to provide for it,
protection for it was found in the due process clauses. 63 Economic
freedoms are less highly prized now, and so "liberty of contract" is
no longer a vital doctrine. 64 Substantive due process, however, despite occasional pronouncements of its demise,65 retains vitality, protecting interests that a new generation of Americans have come to
see as fundamental, interests as diverse as freedom of travel and privacy. 66 The divorce of the text from the use that has been made of
the due process clause is by now so complete that the clause has even
been held to restrain the exercise of governmental power that does
not result in a deprivation of "life, liberty, or property." Thus, quite
apart from whether the practice involves any coercive effect upon
individuals, the states are - by reason of the due process clause 62. Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrincilesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19
(1959).
63. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905).
64. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
65. See, e.g., 372 U.S. at 729.
66. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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prohibited from supporting religious schools. 67 Textual analysis will
not yield, will not even permit, that restriction upon state power, but
in the interpretation of the due process clause, it is not the text that
controls. "[T]he basis of the restriction," as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
once wrote, "is the whole experience of our people." 68
The equal protection clause, too, has been read as an authorization to fill in the lacunae in the system of restraints upon governmental power that can be drawn from other, more specific provisions of
the Constitution - to fill them in, moreover, according to contemporary views concerning the limits that ought to be placed upon that
power. We have it on the highest authority that
[t]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of
a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue
of what
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental
69
rights.

If the quotation jars, it does so not because of its content, but because of'its candor. Decisions under the equal protection clause
have always been heavily value-laden, and necessarily so, since
value premises (other than the values of "equality" and "rational70
ity") are necessary to the determination that the clause requires.
This is most obviously so under the so-called "new equal protection," which subjects legislation to "strict scrutiny" if it touches "fundamental interests" or employs "suspect" bases of classification. A
determination of the interests that are to be ranked as "fundamental" or the classifications that are to be viewed as "suspect" necessarily rests upon value premises drawn from a source other than the
equal protection clause itself.7 ' The need for such premises is no
less, however, under the traditional equal protection test of "rationality": a determination whether there is a "rational basis" for the
67. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

68. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 215 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See M. HowE, supra note 32, at 136-48.
69. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
70. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality,and Equal Frotection, 82 YALE L.J. 123
(1972). Cf.C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 1-60
(1963).
71. See generally, Note, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1159-69 (1969). The lone exception concerns legislation hostile to blacks, since the equal
protection clause was primarily a product of the desire to prohibit such legislation. See Shadissenting). Yet, even a determination
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
of the invalidity of legislation hostile to blacks must often rest on value premises that cannot be
directly attributed to those responsible for the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. See
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: PoliticalResponsibility and the Judicial
Role, 42 U. CH. L. REv. 653, 664-66 (1975).
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differing treatment accorded two classes requires the existence of an
extrinsic standard - a value or values other than equality and rationality - with reference to which the classification can be mea72
sured.
The values that have informed decisions under the equal protection clause, as under the due process clause, are those that each generation has thought appropriate to its time. In the heyday of "liberty
of contract," a Court committed to laissezfaire found a good deal of
"irrationality" in governmental regulation of the economy. 73 The
death of "liberty of contract" involved more than the passing of a
doctrine; it reflected the end of a commitment to the values of laissez
faire. Not surprisingly, therefore, when the Court abandoned "liberty of contract," it simultaneously relinquished the use of the equal
protection clause to police governmental regulation of the economy.74 Legislation that had appeared irrational in the light of certain value premises no longer seemed so when those premises were
abandoned.
"Substantive equal protection," like "substantive due process," is
nevertheless of continuing significance, providing the means by
which the Court may protect interests that have come to be viewed
as fundamental but that cannot easily be read into more specific constitutional provisions limiting governmental power. The "right to
vote" is illustrative. As originally written, the Constitution left with
the states the power to decide who might vote in state elections. Save
for the limited incursions on that power made by the fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-sixth amendments, the Constitution appears unchanged in this respect. Yet, progressive expansion of the franchise
has been the rule of our history. We have come to believe that "[tihe
right to vote. . . is of the essence of a democratic society and [that]
any restriction on that right strikes at the heart of representative government." 75 In the absence of more specific authority to subject to
constitutional restraint a matter so "close to the core of our constitutional system,"' 76 the court has employed the equal protection clause
to void restrictions on the franchise incompatible with the nation's
evolving ideals.77 The invalidity of these restrictions may, as the
72. See id. at 658.
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412 (1920); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
74. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949).
75. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
76. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
77. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
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Court said in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,78 be "founded

...on what the Equal Protection Clause requires," but only if what
the equal protection clause requires is that legislation be judged by
contemporary values.
The use of the due process and equal protection clauses to import
into the Constitution each generation's conception of the "basic values of a free society" has vastly expanded our capacity to shape constitutional law to current values. Even as so interpreted, of course,
those provisions cannot be employed to justify any result toward
which we might be inclined at a particular moment. The meaning
that we give to them, like the meaning that we give to other provisions of the Constitution, must take account of "the line of their
growth.

' 79

Limitation of state power to enact laws "respecting an

establishment of religion," notwithstanding the absence of support
for that restriction in the text and pre-adoption history of the due
process clause, was tenable primarily because of a developing tendency to look to the Bill of Rights in determining the meaning that
ought to be given to that clause. It would be much more difficult to
read the due process clause, as some state supreme courts have read
the cognate clauses of their own constitutions,80 to restrict governmental power to engage in commercial and industrial activities. The
Supreme Court resisted using the due process clause to impose such
a restriction even when it was actively engaged in the review of economic policy.8 ' Suddenly to impose that restriction now, in the face
of the Court's refusal during the past four decades to read the due
process clause as a limitation upon economic policy, would require
too abrupt a departure from what the clause has come to mean.
To stress the element of choice in constitutional interpretation is
not to argue that contemporary discretion is unlimited, but only that
the limits are not those imposed by the language and pre-adoption
history of the Constitution. The limits, so far as they exist, are those
that have developed over time in the ongoing process of valuation
that occurs in the name of the Constitution. So understood, the limits upon permissible constitutional interpretation are not external
constraints upon our ability to read the Constitution as the embodi(1972); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kraemer v. Union Free School Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

78. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
79. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
80. See, e.g., cases cited in H. ROT-ESCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 634-37 (1939).
81. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217
(1917).
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ment of current values; they are, rather, the elements of reason that
are intrinsic to the process of determining whether a proposed interpretation truly reflects those values. That choice is circumscribed at
a given moment does not mean that it is limited over time, however.
The notion that government enterprise is so inconsistent with the
fundamental values of our society as to offend the due process clause
may now seem strained, but it was a good deal more plausible a halfcentury ago, and it is conceivable (though perhaps improbable) that
82
a half-century from now the wheel will have turned full circle. If
that should happen, it seems safe to predict, the restraints that currently limit our ability to read the due process clause as outlawing
government enterprise will have been considerably loosened. The
underlying changes that will have led to a belief that government
enterprise should be prohibited will have led also to other decisions
limiting the government's role in the economy. A belief that government should not engage in commercial or industrial activity is, in
other words, related to a more general system of values. If the belief
is sufficiently strong that a constitutional sanction for it seems plausible, that more general system of values is likely to have been given
expression in other decisions, including decisions under the due pro83
cess clause.
In assessing the latitude available for shaping constitutional law
to current values, in any event, it is well to recall that we are not
limited to exploiting the ambiguities of language in a single constitutional provision. It is, in Marshall's pregnant phrase, "a constitution
we are expounding," not a word or clause whose meaning is to be
derived in isolation from the document as a whole. The question,
always, is whether the exercise of power is consistent with the entire
Constitution, a question that can be answered only by taking into
account, so far as they are relevant, all of the values to which the
Constitution - as interpreted over time - gives expression.
"The life of the common law," Professor F.S.C. Milsom has written, "has been in the unceasing abuse of its elementary ideas."' 84 The
82. Justice Miller's prediction concerning the future of the equal protection clause may
serve as an appropriate caution to those inclined to believe that present-day interpretation of
one or another provisions of the Constitution must endure. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872), it will be recalled, Justice Miller wrote for the Court:
In the light of the history of the Civil War amendments, and the pervading purpose of
them,. . . it is not difficult to give meaning to this clause ....
• . .We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81.
83. See text at notes 99-101 infra.
84. S.MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW xi (1969).
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process he describes in elucidating this aphorism is familiar as well
to students of constitutional law:
If the rules of property give now what seems an unjust answer, try
obligation; and equity has proved that from the materials of obligation
you can counterfeit almost all the phenomena of property. If the rules
of contract give what now seems an unjust answer, try tort. Your
counterfeit will look odd to one brought up on categories of Roman
origin but it will work. If the rules of one tort, say deceit, give what
try another, try negligence. And so the
now seems an unjust answer,
85
legal world goes round.

The array of concepts and values that may be found in the Constitution affords similar opportunities for responding to the "felt necessities of the time."'86 The various provisions of the Constitution reflect
a multitude of values. When an issue arises concerning the authority
of government, the possibility of recourse to one rather than another
constitutional provision to resolve the issue enables us to decide
which values are to be emphasized from among the numerous values
to which the Constitution gives expression. In this way, we draw
upon the past for guidance without being controlled by it.
We are accustomed to thinking about this process primarily in
situations where the values expressed by different constitutional provisions conflict - as, for example, when there is a need to choose
between the exigencies of the war power and our abhorrence of racial discrimination,8 7 or between freedom of the press and the right
of criminal defendants to a fair trial.88 Often, however, the need for
choice from among constitutional provisions arises because the values that impel us toward a particular decision may plausibly be said
to receive expression in more than one constitutional provision.
Since those values are expressed differently in the different provisions, however, the implications of reliance upon one or another of
the provisions may differ significantly. If the implications of resting
decision upon one constitutional provision are unacceptable, it may
be possible to rest decision upon another with implications we can
accept. The existence of such "overlapping" constitutional provisions thus permits us to achieve a more sensitive accommodation of
competing values than would otherwise be possible and thereby con85. Id at xi-xii.
86. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 17, at 5.
87. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United

States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
88. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S.Ct. 2841 (1980); Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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tributes to our capacity to adapt the Constitution to the balance of
values that currently seems appropriate.
The constitutional issue confronted by the Supreme Court in
Jones v. AlfredH. Mayer Co. 89 is illustrative. In that case, the Court

construed section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982, as creating a cause of action against a person who on racial
grounds refused to sell real property to blacks. There remained the
question whether the statute, as so construed, was within the constitutional competence of Congress. In a number of early cases, the
Court had held that Congress lacked power to legislate against private racial discrimination. 90 Those cases, however, were decided
during a period of reaction against the expansion of federal power
that had occurred in the years immediately following the Civil War
and at a time of federal withdrawal from responsibility for the condition of blacks in American society, a withdrawal symptomatic of a
more general submergence of blacks during that period. In the intervening years, important changes had occurred in the United States.
Congress, if not yet a national legislature, had acquired vastly expanded powers, with authority to legislate concerning problems national in scope. And improvement in the position of blacks had
come to be viewed as the nation's most pressing domestic problem.
Consideration of "what this country has become," thus, strongly supported a conclusion that Congress had plenary authority in the management of race relations.
These considerations were not dispositive of the constitutional issue posed in Mayer, however, for there remained the question
whether recognition of plenary congressional authority in the management of race relations was compatible with other values to which
the Constitution gives expression. The existence of overlapping constitutional provisions, and of overlapping legal doctrines generally, is
important largely because they contribute to our ability to deal with
precisely such questions. Congressional authority to enact the 1866
statute, as interpreted, might conceivably have been rested upon the
fifth section of the fourteenth amendment, which empowers Congress to enact legislation to enforce the amendment's substantive
provision, including the guarantee of "the equal protection of the
laws." To have rested congressional authority on the fourteenth
amendment, however, would have had ramifications far beyond the
issue posed in Mayer. The due process and equal protection clauses
89. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
90. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3

(1883).
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extend to the full range of subjects on which the states are competent
to legislate. The primary constraint upon the use of those clauses to
enlarge federal power is the principle that they apply only where the
challenged conduct is the product of "state action." 9' Abandonment
of the "state action" requirement would strain, perhaps beyond the
breaking point, the notion that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers. Yet, it is precisely the abandonment of
the "state action" limitation that would have been required were the
fourteenth amendment to have been employed as the source of authority to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866. To be sure, the conception of the federal government as a government of enumerated
powers was already under considerable strain, but that conception
has not yet been wholly abandoned, and, given the continuing concern in the United States for decentralization of governmental
power, there is good reason to approach cautiously a decision that
would have that effect. If the fourteenth amendment were the sole
potential source of authority for the 1866 Act, nevertheless, it would
seemingly have been essential to determine whether expansion of
congressional authority to legislate concerning race relations was
worth the cost of vastly extending congressional authority by eliminating the state action requirement.
In the event, the Court was saved from the necessity of facing up
to that question by its ability to find authority for enactment of the
1866 Act in the thirteenth amendment. That amendment, like the
fourteenth, had been adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War with
the purpose of securing "the freedom of the slave race, the security
and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him."'9 2 The subsequent histories of the two amendments differ significantly, however.
Whereas the due process and equal protection clauses have been
read expansively, as applicable to an ever widening range of issues,
interpretation of the thirteenth amendment has diverged little from
its original purpose. A decision resting congressional authority on
the thirteenth amendment, accordingly, implied no more than that
Congress had full authority to legislate with respect to the relics of
slavery, ie., to exercise plenary legislative authority in the management of race relations.
In combination, the expansive reading of the thirteenth amend91. Cf Howe, Federalism and Civil Rights, in A. Cox, M. Howe & J. WIGGINS, CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 30, 49 (1967).

92. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872).
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ment in Mayer and the prevailing interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment achieve a more sensitive balance of the relevant competing values than could easily have emerged if it had been necessary to
work out constitutional doctrine through either of those provisions
standing alone. Private conduct is brought under federal control in a
limited area, the management of race relations, in which the accomplishment of national objectives requires plenary federal power. Official conduct, on the other hand, is broadly subject to federal
supervision in a large number of areas in which we are as yet unprepared to accept the complete centralization of governmental power
but nonetheless wish to subject the states to minimal national standards.
Measured by the standards of textual analysis and historical inquiry, it may be that this careful delineation of federal authority was
achieved only by an "abuse of [the Constitution's] elementary
ideas."'93 Slavery is commonly understood to mean bondage enforced by law. The discrimination alleged by the plaintiff in Mayer
was not enforced by law, nor could it fairly be considered bondage.
Yet, the decision in Mayer was not a radical break with the past.
Although the men who adopted the thirteenth amendment may not
have seen beyond the need for emancipation, 94 experience subsequent to the amendment's adoption led Congress to conclude that
additional "protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from
the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised dominion over
him" was necessary and could be achieved only through the exercise
of federal power. Authority was found in the thirteenth amendment. 95 The Court responded by sustaining congressional power
under the thirteenth amendment to prohibit bondage even though
97
not supported by state law.96 And as early as the CivilRights Cases
- one might say even in those cases - the Court had intimated that
it was not only bondage that Congress might proscribe under the
thirteenth amendment, but "all badges and incidents of slavery."
Although formally reserving the question, the Court went on to sug93. See Note, The "Wew" Thirteenth Amendment: A PreliminaryAnalysir, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1294, 1295-300 (1969). But see Howe, supra note 91, at 43-51; tenBroek, Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution ofthe United States, 39 CAL. L. REv. 171 (1951).
94. See generally, Note, supra note 93.
95. The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were, of course, adopted to buttress congressional authority, but not all that was done by Congress and sustained by the Court can find
sanction in those amendments. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
96. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216-18 (1905); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
20-23 (1883) (dictum).
97. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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gest that these "badges and incidents" included "disability to hold
property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness against a white person, and such like disabilities and incapacities."'98 These decisions did not extend congressional power under
the thirteenth amendment as far as it was extended in Mayer, but
they nonetheless represented a determination that the proscription of
slavery - legally enforced bondage -

did not mark the outer limits

of congressional power. Continuing experience, and the valuations
born of it, led to further expansion of federal power, sometimes initiated by the Court, 99 sometimes by the Congress.10 0 These actions

were not taken "under" the thirteenth amendment, but they were
important nevertheless as steps in the development of a "considered
consensus"' 01 concerning the broad reach of federal power to deal
with the varied problems of race relations.
Neither the early decisions that gave an expansive reading to the
thirteenth amendment nor the evolution of the consensus supporting
plenary federal power to deal with problems of race relations are
relevant to the issue posed in Mayer if the contemporary application
of constitutional provisions is to be deduced from principles whose
meaning is fixed at the time of their inclusion in the Constitution.
But as I have essayed to demonstrate in the preceding pages, that
view of constitutional interpretation is wholly at variance with our
constitutional tradition. The reality of our tradition, to paraphrase
Karl Llewellyn's prescription for the interpretation of aging statutes,
has not been to determine the meaning of the Constitution by reference to the sense originally intended to be put into it, but rather for
the sense which can be quarried out of it. The "quest does not run
primarily in terms of historical intent. It runs in terms of what the
words can be made to bear, in making sense in the new light of what
was originally unforeseen."102
II
The capacity of constitutional law to adapt to changing circumstances and ideals is now so generally accepted that it has become a
part of the conventional wisdom of lawyers and informed segments
98. 109 U.S. at 22.
99. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
100. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scat-

tered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
101. The phrase is Justice Brennan's in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961).
102. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 374 (1960).
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of the laity. Yet, the influence of earlier attitudes persists. Many,
perhaps most, students of the subject would insist that although constitutional law is capable of growth, the Constitution is an historical
document that has a core of meaning independent of the interpretation subsequently given to it, meaning that not only interests historians but also constrains development of constitutional law. The
words employed by the framers and the meaning they sought to convey, it is said, impose limits on choice, limits that can be altered only
by an amendment of the document. Language alone, and certainly
language supported by pre-adoption history, are by this view sufficient to foreclose some constitutional arguments - say, that Congress may license printing presses or authorize the use of torture to
extract confessions from persons accused of crime. The claim, in
other words, is that the specific intentions of the framers establish a
minimum or core meaning of the various provisions of the Constitution. ;Although subsequent generations may expand constitutional
provisions beyond that core of meaning, the core itself is inviola03
ble.1
Even if this claim were valid, it would not seriously disturb the
conclusion that constitutional law is more nearly an expression of
contemporary values than of values stipulated by the framers. No
more than a passing familiarity with history is required to appreciate
that only a very small fraction of contemporary constitutional law
corresponds with what can plausibly be considered the historical
"core meaning" of the Constitution, even on the most generous interpretation of that notion. For the rest we must look not to choices
that were made by the framers but to those made by subsequent generations. Nor is it plausible to argue that the luxuriant growth of
constitutional law beyond the so-called "core meaning" of the Constitution can be derived from principles that underlie the framers'
specific intentions. The principles that will explain those intentions
do not inhere in the evidence from which we infer the intentions.
They are a contemporary construct. Just as many principles can be
constructed to explain a series of decisions, numerous principles can
be constructed that will explain, and hence be said to underlie, the
framers' specific intentions. 10 4 Choice from among the various alter103. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 63-64 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (comment of
J.P. Frank). The validity of the claim often seems to be assumed, as in Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970), where the Court, although holding that the sixth amendment guarantee of
jury trial in criminal cases does not require a jury of 12, as at common law, appears to have
assumed that a contrary result would have been necessary if historical evidence had required a

conclusion that a 12-person jury were central to the intentions of the framers. 399 U.S. at 8699.
104. See Sandalow, JudicialProtectionofMinorities,75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1169 (1977).
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natives is inescapable, and through that choice contemporary values
are given expression. No doubt, a commitment to respect the framers' specific intentions would narrow the range of choice, but constitutional history amply demonstrates that such a commitment would
still permit widely divergent views concerning the proper content of
constitutional law.
The proposition that the framers' specific intentions establish a
core of meaning that is inviolable by subsequent generations is, in
any event, of doubtful validity. The issue seems most nearly to have
been posed in the Supreme Court by Home Building & Loan Associa-

tion v. Blaisdel, 10 5 and in that instance the Court departed from the
framers' specific intentions in favor of an evolutionary interpretation
of the contract clause. Of course, a single case, even one as important as Blaisdell, does not adequately test the claim that there is an
inviolable core of constitutional meaning, but then neither do the
hypothetical cases that are customarily invoked to support it.106 No
doubt it is true that the Supreme Court would, if the issue were
posed at the present term, invalidate legislation licensing printing
presses or authorizing the use of torture to extract confessions. But
these and similar hypothetical cases that might be suggested to test
the claim pose issues with respect to which our values coincide with
those of the framers. For many such issues, indeed, the development
of our values over the course of nearly two centuries has been in the
direction of strengthening belief in the wisdom of the framers' intentions. 10 7 In consequence, we have lacked impetus to develop intellectual foundations that would permit us to depart from those
intentions. Not only do we lack such foundations, but because of the
coincidence of our values and what we apprehend as the "core
meaning," our sympathies lie with theories that promise to insulate
that meaning from depredation by those who someday may wish to
depart from it. It is understandable that in these circumstances it
should seem "unthinkable" that the courts would depart from the
"core meaning" of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the inventiveness
that has been demonstrated in designing such foundations when the
framers' intentions and newly emerging values do diverge counsels
105. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
106. Cf. Wechsler, supra note 62, at 12 ("no one would argue, for example, that there need

not be indictment and a jury trial in prosecutions for a felony in district courts").
107. Perhaps the point is somewhat overstated. Continuing fidelity to the historical "core"

meaning of some constitutional provisions may be attributable less to a current commitment to
the values that led to their adoption than to the fact that they have come to serve other values
or because we have learned that fidelity can be maintained without sacrifice of current values.

1n either event, the argument in the text holds.
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caution before concluding that there is a core of constitutional meaning impervious to change, save by amendment.
The point is not that we should expect the historical meaning of a
constitutional provision to be immediately ignored if an army of social scientists were suddenly to demonstrate that the well-being of
the nation would be served thereby.10 8 Changes in law do not come
about in that way. They do not because change does not occur that
way in life. Changes in constitutional law, and the altered circumstances, knowledge, and valuations that underlie them, occur incrementally. The original meaning of the document is not abandoned
at a single moment, but gradually. When, for example, in Blaisdell,
the Court sustained legislation that the contract clause was designed
to prevent, it relied in part upon a foundation of earlier decisions
that had shaped that clause to accommodate evolving perceptions of
social need, decisions that served as a "doctrinal bridge"' 0 9 between
the original understanding of the clause and the result that seemed
appropriate a century and a half later. To assess the claim that constitutional provisions have a core of meaning that permanently constraing interpretation, it is necessary to imagine not only the
circumstances that might lead to a desire to interpret the provisions
inconsistently with that "core meaning," but the development of
those circumstances over time and the decisions that would have
been made in responding to that development.
Now it will be said that whether or not it is predictable that
courts would depart from the framers' specific intentions in the event
contemporary values were to diverge sufficiently from those intentions, they ought not to do so. Respect for those intentions, it might
be argued, is implicit in the very idea that we are expounding a Constitution, not fashioning common law. Yet, once it is accepted that
constutitional law should not be confined to the specific intentions of
the framers, it is by no means obvious how it can be consistently
maintained that those intentions represent an irreducible core of
108. Cf.Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? 4 Comment on the Two-Level Theory of
Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640, 646 (1965).
109. See Fuller, 4mericanLegalRealism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 441-42 (1934). The concept of a doctrinal bridge may help to explain why there are some (very few) constitutional
provisions whose meaning is virtually certain to remain constant over time and that can therefore be altered only by amendment. No one, for example, is likely to argue that the age limitations imposed by articles I and I are subject to modification by interpretation. In these, and a
few similar instances, the precision of the language employed by the framers seems to preclude
even the slightest deviation from its meaning when adopted. Yet, even as to such provisions,

one must not dismiss entirely the possibility that change can be accomplished by invoking
another, more general provision of the Constitution. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970).
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meaning immune from the normal processes of constitutional development. It is, for example, hard to see why it should be permissible,
in response to changed circumstances and values, to interpret the
first amendment as limiting private actions for defamation, though
the framers would not have given it that effect, and yet be impermissible to interpret the amendment as permitting censorship if the
evolution of our circumstances and our values seems to require such
a result.110
There is, however, a more fundamental flaw in the claim that the
specific intentions of the framers establish an inviolable core of constitutional meaning. What that claim ignores is that history does not
reside merely in the past, but in the interaction of the past with the
present. Whatever may have been the specific intentions of the
framers, the understanding of those intentions by subsequent generations is necessarily conditioned by concepts with which the latter are
familiar but that were unknown to the framers. The perception of
the so-called "core meaning" of a constitutional provision cannot,
for that reason, remain constant: as new concepts emerge (or older
but heretofore submerged concepts become salient) - reflecting altered circumstances and values - there must be an accompanying
change in the understanding of the framers' intentions. Obviously
the development of constitutional law cannot be constrained by the
"core meaning" of the Constitution if the way the "core meaning" is
understood depends upon contemporary circumstances and values.
I do not mean by raising this issue to enter into the age-old controversy about whether objectivity can be achieved in the study of
history. For whether our understanding of the past is distorted by
the fact that we live in the present, it is inevitably influenced thereby.
The point can best be illustrated by a problem of historiography with
which lawyers have a special familiarity, that of determining the
holding of a case. The principle by which a holding is expressed, as
every first-year law student learns, may vary over time, not because
of any change in the opinion of the court but because of ideas that
emerge subsequent thereto. Consider, for example, the plight of a
neophyte law student who, on successive days, is called upon to
"state the holding" of United States v. Wade. 111 On the first day,
having read only the opinions in that case, he might respond thus: a
person suspected of a crime may not, consistently with the sixth
amendment, be placed in a line-up for identification unless he has
110. Cf. SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW, supra note

103, at 73-74.

111. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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been afforded an opportunity to have counsel present. But on the2
following day, after having read the decision in Kirby v. Illinois, 1
where the Court limited Wade to situations in which the suspect had
been indicted or otherwise formally charged with a criminal offense,
he cannot state the holding in the same way. The effect of Kirby is
not merely to clarify "the law" but to require a reformulation of the
way in which Wade is understood. Nor does Kirby influence the
understanding of Wade only because Kirby was decided by the
Supreme Court. Precisely the same change in the way Wade is understood would have been required if the distinction had been sughaving thought about the case for a
gested by the instructor or if,
while, the student had himself concluded that there were potential
grounds for distinguishing between pre- and post-indictment lineups. In either event, an effort to state the holding would somehow
have to come to terms with the fact that Wade does not necessarily
mean that counsel is required at a pre-indictment line-up. The decision does not, in other words, have a meaning independent of the
concepts available to those who seek to understand it.
The same problem inheres in the effort to understand the framers' intentions. Contemporary understanding of those intentions is
necessarily influenced by any relevant ideas that are familiar to us,
even though they were not known to or salient for the framers. We
cannot state the framers' intentions in a way that will seem accurate
to us without somehow taking account of such ideas. Suppose, for
example, that in the First Congress and in each of the state legislatures that ratified the first amendment assurances had been given
that "freedom of the press" meant, interalia, that newspapers would
not be required to provide a "right of reply" to persons whom they
had allegedly defamed. History has rarely, if ever, provided us with
so clear a statement of the framers' intentions. Even intentions so
clearly stated, however, cannot have the same clarity in 1981 as in
1791. Concentration of economic power and more specifically concentration of control within the media of mass communication have
in recent years led to increasing concern that a major value underlying the first amendment - providing the public with a broad spectrum of information and opinion - is in jeopardy. The situation
differs markedly from that which prevailed when the first amendment was adopted, when "[elntry into publishing was inexpensive,"
and "there was relatively easy access to the channels of communica112. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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tion."' 113 Once this distinction is drawn, the framers' intentions appear in a new light. It no longer seems entirely accurate to state
simply that they intended to prohibit Congress from imposing an
obligation on newspapers to afford a right of reply. So unqualified a
statement would suggest that they meant the prohibition to apply in
the very different circumstances of our own time. But our
knowledge of their intentions does not extend that far, and a contemporary statement of those intentions must somehow accommodate
that fact.
Now it might be said that the framers were aware of their inability to foresee the future and provided, in article V, a process by
which the Constitution could be amended to reflect changed circumstances and values. The existence of formal amendment machinery
cannot be used to support the "core meaning" thesis in this way,
however, for the problem is to determine when that machinery must
be employed. Since the thesis requires a formal amendment when
(but only when) there is to be a departure from the "core meaning,"
a method of ascertaining that meaning is essential. Yet, the effort to
locate it in the specific intentions of the framers founders upon the
difficulty of prescribing the level of generality at which those intentions are to be understood. Are we, for example, to understand the
framers' intentions in the hypothetical illustration above as: (1)
prohibiting Congress from imposing a "right of reply" obligation
upon newspapers, or (2) prohibiting Congress from imposing a
"right of reply" obligation upon newspapers in circumstances in
which control over the communications media is widely dispersed? 14 The "core meaning" thesis seems implicitly to assume
that the former is appropriate, presumably because that is the level
of generality employed by the framers in expressing themselves. But
to understand the framers in that way distorts their intentions by
attributing to them a choice they could not have made, just as it
would distort the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Wade
to understand it as having determined whether counsel is required at
a pre-indictment line-up.
Although the argument thus far seems to emphasize the impor113. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974). See Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1967).
114. Or, to draw from actual rather than hypothetical history, did the framers by adopting
the first amendment intend that Congress should not (1) license (a) printing presses, (b) any
device for reproduction of the printed word, (c) any means of communication, (d) any means
of communication except those whose number is limited by physical laws; or (2) establish a
censorship system (a) for printed matter, (b) for any form of communication; or (3) interfere in
any way, prior to publication, with (a) printed matter, or (b) any form of communication; or

(4) etc.?
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tance of changed circumstances, the influence of the present upon
the way in which we understand the past is ultimately attributable to
contemporary values. Our times differ from those of the framers in
innumerable ways. The question is which of the many ways is to
count as significant, a question that in the end is one of value. 1981
differs from 1791, for example, in that we now have universal adult
suffrage. Yet, an accurate understanding of the framers' intentions
concerning the immunity of newspapers from a "right of reply" obligation does not depend upon our noting that difference, for we lack a
plausible theory to account for its relevance. Nothing in the values
underlying the first amendment, as we understand them, would justify varying the immunity according to whether there is restricted or
universal suffrage. By contrast, an accurate understanding of the
framers' intentions does require a qualified statement that notes the
ease of access to the channels of communication that characterized
their times. The difference is that we do have a theory, responsive to
first amendment values, that suggests why that fact might be relevant
to the existence of the immunity.
Our sense that in the present the framers' meaning is not adequately conveyed by an unqualified statement of their intentions
draws support from the fact that those intentions were necessarily
more complex than such a statement suggests. Constitutional law
has long been informed by an awareness that the so-called "specific
intentions" of the framers - the rules that they understood to be
embodied in the constitutional provisions they adopted - existed
within a broader framework of values. 1 5 Just as our understanding
of the framers' intentions is distorted if we focus exclusively upon
those values, ignoring the particular rules by which they were expressed,' 6 distortion also occurs if we focus solely upon the rules
and ignore the purposes that the rules were thought to serve. An
appreciation of the complexity of the framers' intentions, however,
leads to an awareness that, in relation to our time, those intentions
are often quite ambiguous. Rules and purposes that were once consistent with one another may now seem to point in divergent directions. In view of the multiplicity of the framers' purposes and the
varying levels of generality with which those purposes can be stated,
there is bound to be - if we have the inclination to seek it - ample
opportunity to argue that any contemporary values that would be
disserved by adherence to the rules contemplated by the framers are
115. See text at note 10 supra.
116. See text at notes 53-54 supra.
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rooted in values to which they intended to give constitutional expression. The ability thus to identify contemporary values with the
framers' purposes reinforces our sense that the framers' meaning is
not presently captured by an unqualified statement of their intentions. 17
In brief, the so-called "core meaning" of the Constitution is not
static. The way it is understood depends upon the interaction of the
present with the evidence of the past. The framers' specific intentions cannot constrain the development of constitutional law because
those intentions can always be redefined so as to exclude from them
the issue that we now confront. Such a redefinition is neither misleading nor disingenuous. Accurate understanding of the framers'
intentions requires that we appreciate their limits. The notion that
the framers' specific intentions define an inviolable core of constitutional meaning thus founders upon the same difficulty as the notion,
more clearly rejected by history, that those intentions establish the
outer limits of permissible constitutional development: the issues for
which subsequent generations have sought constitutional answers
are not those that the framers addressed.

Constitutional law thus emerges not as exegesis, but as a process
by which each generation gives formal expression to the values it
holds fundamental in the operations of government. The intentions
of the framers describe neither its necessary minimal content nor its
permissible outer boundaries. Nor is it surprising that that should be
so. The framers were a remarkable group of men, and we are significantly in their debt, but it is a fallacy to suppose that because of their
antiquity we can look to them for the wisdom that men seek from
their elders. Their experience was more limited than ours. As Pascal
wrote more than three centuries ago, in protesting the subjugation of
his age to the ideas of the ancients:
Those whom we term the Ancients, were in fact novices in every
thing, and formed, properly speaking, the infancy of Humanity; and,
as we have added to their knowledge the experience of succeeding
ages, it is in ourselves we must find that antiquity we so reverence in
others. 118
117. Caution is necessary, however. We are justified in concluding that an accurate understanding of the framers' meaning requires a qualified statement of their intentions. It would
not be justifiable to conclude that in light of their underlying purposes they would have in-

tended that newspapers not enjoy an immunity in circumstances such as those that now exist.
See text at note 60 supra.
118. B. PASCAL, THOUGHTS ON RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 243 (I. Taylor trans. 1894).
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It is we, not the framers, who have the experience of life under the
document they wrote and who are familiar with the problems of
maintaining a constitutional order. More fundamentally, we live in
a world that they could not have contemplated, even in fantasy. One
thinks first of the changes that technology has wrought or of the influence of the vast population migrations during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Yet these are only a part - and not necessarily
the major part - of the gulf that separates their age from ours. No
more is necessary than to mention Bentham and Mill, Darwin, Marx
and Weber, Freud, Keynes, and Einstein and Heisenberg to appreciate how different is our perception of the world from that of the
framers - or, for that matter, from that of the Reconstruction Congress. 119 In these circumstances, it would be surprising - even remarkable - if the intentions of the framers did control the
constitutional law of the present.
To argue that neither the language of the Constitution nor the
intentions of those who employed it controls, the meaning that may
subsequently be given to the Constitution is not, of course, to argue
that they lack relevance to the process by which that meaning is derived. Constitutional law is the means by which we express the values that we hold to be fundamental in the operations of government.
Judges, or others who wish to appeal to the Constitution, must
demonstrate that the principles upon which they propose to confer
constitutional status express values that our society does hold to be
fundamental. One way in which that can be done is by showing that
those values are rooted in history, that they are not merely the result
of the interests or passions of the moment. As Willard Hurst has
written,
Men do not create satisfying concepts of life's worth or meaning by
simple fiat. Nor do they by enactment, however solemn, create a living
nation, church,
or economy. Men grow into values, attitudes, and in1 20
stitutions.
The study of history thus enhances our understanding of ourselves,
and in doing so illuminates the issues we confront. Although all of
history is relevant for that purpose, some periods may have special
significance, among which are those surrounding the adoption of the
Constitution or the amendments thereto.12 ' The events of those
119. See C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS

47 (1932).
120. J. W. HURST, JUSTICE HOLMES ON LEGAL HISTORY 25 (1964).
121. But not only these periods. No amendments to the Constitution were adopted during
the New Deal (save for the largely peripheral 21st amendment), but the experience of those
years is an important influence upon current thought about constitutional law and seems likely
to be so for the foreseeable future.
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times and the responses that were made to them have played a role
-

on many issues, an important role -

in shaping contemporary

thought. Decisions were made that established the initial shape of
institutions that we have inherited. Concepts were formulated that
became not merely the lens through which succeeding generations
have viewed the world, but the material from which they have fashioned solutions to the problems they have confronted. It is not surprising, then, that we turn to these periods, perhaps more than to
others, in the effort to give structure to our aspirations, to determine
the meaning that we ought to give to the Constitution. The search,
however, is not for knowledge of the precise accommodation of competing values achieved by the framers, in order that we may somehow deduce the answer to current problems from it, but for a better
understanding of the choices that must now be made and of the risks
attendant upon alternative solutions. In this way, we draw upon the
past, not for answers, but for guidance in coping with the problems
that now confront us.
Yet, precisely because we seek a better understanding of the present and guidance in dealing with its problems rather than knowledge
of the past for its own sake, we search out from the past those elements of experience and strains of thought that appear most relevant
to our own time. In doing so, we almost inevitably mute other parts
of that history which -

were they to be emphasized -

might sup-

port a very different interpretation of the Constitution from that at
which we have arrived. The picture of a past period that emerges
when its history is approached in this way is very different from that
which would be drawn by one who sought knowledge of the past for
its own sake. But we do not, at least not as constitutional lawyers,
seek knowledge of the past merely to understand it. "Our only interest inthe past," as Holmes wrote, "is for the light it throws upon the
present."' 22 The meaning of an earlier period for us - say of the
constitutional period or of reconstruction - thus depends upon the
fact that it is joined to our time by the years between. Our concern is
with ideas in motion. The question is not simply what the framers
thought, but what has become of their ideas in the time between
their age and ours.
So, for example, the concern for political liberty and freedom
from oppressive governmental action that has dominated constitutional thought in recent decades has led us to seek out evidence of
the similar concern during the years surrounding the adoption of the
122. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HA v. L. REv. 457, 474 (1897).

HeinOnline -- 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1070 1980-1981

April 1981]

ConstitutionalInterpretation

1071

Constitution. We have shown a good deal less interest in the attitudes toward law and judicial discretion that were also characteristic
of that period, 123 attitudes that - were they to be emphasized would severely limit our current capacity to give to the Bill of Rights
the generous reading required by modem ideals. Inattention to these
latter elements of late eighteenth-century thought would be indefensible if we were attempting to describe the original meaning of the
Bill of Rights as a chapter in the history of ideas. Justification depends, rather, upon the divergence between those ideas of the framers and the course that our subsequent history has followed. We see
in the framers' concern for political freedom and security against
governmental oppression the origins of ideals and aspirations to
which the nation has given continuing, even deepening, allegiance.
But the framers' conceptions of law and of the proper role of courts
do not cast a similar light upon the present. The discontinuity is too
great. The evolution of an instrumental conception of law in the
intervening years has helped to create a self-consciously law-making
judiciary, a development that, in turn, has shaped the other institutions of government that we have inherited. In ways and for reasons
that could not have been anticipated by the framers, we have come
to rely upon courts as an important agency for fashioning law to
meet the altering circumstances and needs of the nation. As a consequence, the framers' expressions concerning law and the judicial role
do not convey the same sense of contemporary relevance that we
find in their statements about political liberty. Although we recognize a relationship between their concerns and ours, their expressions seem, somehow, not quite to the point.
The relevant past for purposes of constitutional law, thus, is to be
found not only in the intentions of those who drafted and ratified the
document but in the entirety of our history. But history's relevance,
to recall Holmes's familiar insight, is that of necessity, not of duty.124
The past has given shape to institutions by which the present is governed. To a very considerable extent, moreover, "the range and
depth and intensity of present competence and motive depend upon
perceptions and values given form by the past."1 25 It is nonetheless
123. See, e.g., G. WooD, supra note 99, at 453-63; Horowitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception fAmerican Law, 1780-1820, in LAW INAMERICAN HISTORY 287 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971); Nelson, ChangingConceptionsof JudicialReview: The Evolution of
Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1850, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972); Cooper, Book
Review, 85 HARv.L. REv.702, 705-07 (1972).
124. See Holmes, Learning and Science, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 84, 85 (M. Howe ed. 1962).
125. J. W. HURST, supra note 120, at 23.
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true that in searching the past for a better understanding of the present, we are engaged in a creative activity. We employ the past as a
resource, much as courts in a common-law system employ precedent.
As we explore the past, in an effort to ascertain how it is similar and
how it is different from the present, we see more clearly the choices
we now confront. Yet, however useful an understanding of the past
may be in clarifying those choices, it cannot determine our response
to them. That prerogative -

and burden

-

belongs to the present.
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